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Spot Pricing When Lagrange
Multipliers Are Not Unique
Donghan Feng, Member, IEEE, Zhao Xu, Member, IEEE, Jin Zhong, Senior Member, IEEE, and
Jacob Østergaard, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Classical spot pricing theory is based on multipliers of
the primal problem of an optimal market dispatch, i.e., the solution
of the dual problem. However, the dual problem of market dispatch
may yield multiple solutions. In these circumstances, spot pricing
or any standard pricing practice based on multipliers cannot gen-
erate a unique clearing price. Although such situations are rare,
they can cause significant uncertainties and complexities in market
dispatch. In practice, this situation is solved through simple empir-
ical methods, which may cause additional operations or biased al-
location. Based on a strict extension of the principles of spot pricing
and surplus allocation, we propose a new pricing methodology that
can yield unique, impartial, and robust solution. The new method
has been analyzed and compared with other pricing approaches in
accordance with spot pricing theory. Case studies support the re-
sults of the theoretical analysis, and further demonstrate that the
method performs effectively in both uniform-pricing and nodal-
pricing markets.
Index Terms—Double-sided auction, duality, nodal price, spot
pricing.
NOMENCLATURE
The main notation used throughout the paper is stated next
for quick reference. Other symbols are defined as required.
A. Indices and Numbers
Number of generators in the system.
Number of loads in the system.
Number of pricing zones (buses) in the system.
Number of MDS buses in the system.
Number of non-MDS buses in the system.
Number of transmission lines in the system.
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Number of congested transmission lines in the
system.
Index of generators, from 1 to .
Index of loads, from 1 to .
Index of transmission lines, from 1 to .
Index of pricing buses, from 1 to .
B. Variables and Parameters
Offer price of generator ($/MW).
Bid price of load ($/MW).
Generation of generator (MW).
Demand of load (MW).
Output upper limit of generator (MW).
Output lower limit of generator (MW).
Maximal demand of load (MW).
Minimal demand of load (MW).
Distribution factor of line with respect to the
power injection at bus .
C. Functions and Mappings
Mapping from the index set
of generators to the index set of buses ,
indicating the location of generators.
Mapping from the index set of
loads to the index set of buses , indicating
the location of loads.
Upper round of a fraction/decimal.
Combination with parameters and .
D. Lagrange Multipliers
Multiplier corresponding to the balance
constraint.
Multiplier corresponding to the power flow
limit of transmission line .
Multiplier corresponding to the output upper
limit of generator .
Multiplier corresponding to the minimal
output limit of generator .
Multiplier corresponding to the maximal
demand requirement of the load .
Multiplier corresponding to the minimal
demand requirement of the load .
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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE marginal operation costs of many different types ofgenerators are not piecewise linear with generation output
[1]. On the contrary, offer/bid curves of wholesale electricity
markets are usually stepwise in practice, due to the simplicity
of processing such offers compared with other forms, such as
piecewise linear or quadratic offers. If the steps/blocks are small
enough and the number of blocks is large enough, participants
can use stepwise offers to approximate any offer curve or mar-
ginal cost curve. However, certain market rules are usually ap-
plied to reduce the computation burdens in reality; for example,
the 1 MWh/h minimal bid size in Nordpool [2], a maximum of
10 blocks for a bidding offer in PJM [3] and Australia [4], and
10 MWh/h minimal bidding requirements in the balancing mar-
kets of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland [5].
Stepwise bid/offer curves may lead to multiple dual solutions
(MDS), i.e., the dual problem of market optimization has mul-
tiple solutions. In this situation, spot pricing theory [6] or any
standard pricing methodology based on dual solutions fail to
yield unique market clearing prices.
Current solutions for MDS include:
• pricingbasedon1MWofadditionalgenerationoradditional
consumption [3], which is a biased allocation of social sur-
plus in favor of the demand side or the generation side;
• mandatory rebidding [4], which involves additional opera-
tions and may cause increasingly aggressive bidding.
In a large interconnected electricity market with many par-
ticipants, the increment between price bands is relatively small.
Thus, the controversial part of the social surplus is limited and
will be shared by a large group of market participants, indicating
a limited or negligible effect of MDS. Existing methods such as
those mentioned above are not significantly biased, and are thus
acceptable in such situations.
In a small electricity market where few participants dominate,
for example, the market of a local electric power system of an
island [7], the possibility of MDS occurrence is high and the
impact is significant.
Based on the characteristics of the electricity market dispatch
model, this paper develops a pricing methodology for MDS.
The resultant clearing price is unique, consistent with the clas-
sical spot pricing theory, and irrespective of uniform-pricing or
nodal-pricingmechanisms.Thesolutionalsopossessesimportant
propertiessuchas“boundaryrequirement”,“consistencyrequire-
ment”, “neutrality requirement”, “sensitivity requirement”, and
“limit appropriateness”, which other solutions do not hold.
II. SPOT PRICING REVISITED AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
A double-sided auction market dispatch problem (including
demand-side bidding and transmission constraints) can be for-
mulated as an optimization model as follows [6], [8], [9]:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
The clearing price of a standard method is determined by La-
grange multipliers of (1)–(5). The Lagrange function can be for-
mulated as follows:
(6)
The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions in-
clude
(7)
(8)
(9)
and a set of complementary equations
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
Let the index of the marginal generator (load) be ,
according to KKT conditions, we have
; therefore,
. The standard practice
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Fig. 1. Uniform-pricing cases of (left) load and (right) generator clearing.
Fig. 2. Uniform-pricing case when the dual problem has multiple solutions.
is to set the nodal market clearing price at bus to be
[6], [8].
Fig. 1 illustrates the uniform pricing cases in which the last
chosen generator/load is cleared between its upper or lower
limits. In these situations, the dual problem of (1)–(5) has a
unique solution. However, in general, both the primal and dual
solutions of market optimization can yield multiple solutions.
In the case where (1)–(5), i.e., the primal problem of market
dispatch, has multiple solutions, implying that more than one
participant appears as clearing price setters, certain proportional
rules can be used to solve the puzzle [11].
Fig. 2 illustrates an example where the dual problem of
(1)–(5) has multiple solutions. In this situation, standard
pricing methods using multipliers cannot yield unique solu-
tions.
III. SUGGESTED METHOD
To address the challenge of price setting under MDS, a new
pricing methodology is proposed. This section is divided into
three parts: in Section III-A, the fundamental properties of
model (1)–(5) are analyzed and critical elements for MDS are
identified. In Section III-B, a solution method using the perspec-
tive of surplus allocation is proposed. Finally, in Section III-C,
the effectiveness and implications of the proposed method are
examined and compared with other methods.
A. Theoretical Interval of MDS Pricing
For the th generator dispatched at its upper limit (UL Gen),
based on (12), we have . Thus, (7) becomes
(15)
Because
(16)
For the th load dispatched at its upper limit (UL Load), fol-
lowing the same argument, we have and
(17)
Again because
(18)
Similarly, for the th generator dispatched at its lower limit
(LL Gen), we have and
(19)
For the th load dispatched at its lower limit (LL Load), we
have and
(20)
Now define
(21)
, , , and are four important values for pricing
under MDS; their counterpart in normal situations is the mar-
ginal offer/bid. For conciseness of presentation, we will call
them pseudo marginal offers/bids (PMBs) in the rest of the
paper. Each PMB consists of a real offer of a specific generator
(load) and a congestion term determined by the transmission
network.
Summarizing formulae (16)–(21), the nodal clearing price at
the reference bus should fall in the interval defined as
follows:
(22)
Inequality (22) defines a range of market clearing prices
and the key issue is resolving this multiplicity. For concise-
ness, the left and right sides of (22), i.e., and
, are denoted as clearing price lower limit (CPLL)
and clearing price upper limit (CPUL) in the rest of the paper.
FENG et al.: SPOT PRICING WHEN LAGRANGE MULTIPLIERS ARE NOT UNIQUE 317
Fig. 3. Social, consumer, supplier, allocatable, and pseudo common surpluses
under MDS (the social surplus is represented by the total green shaded area).
B. Incentive and Surplus Allocation Perspective
The objective of market optimization is to maximize the so-
cial welfare. Pricing practice can therefore be perceived as dis-
tributing the social surplus between consumers and suppliers.
Fig. 3 illustrates one such situation, where and
. Note that the dispatch level and the social surplus (SS,
total green shaded area) are uniquely determined. Within the SS,
the consumer surplus (CS) and supplier surplus (PS) are marked
with horizontal stripes and vertical stripes, respectively. There
is a controversial part between CS and PS, marked with crossed
stripes. Standard pricing based on multipliers allows multiple
distributions of this controversial part, as defined by (22). Any
possible unique pricing practice can be perceived as distributing
this controversial part of the SS between consumers and sup-
pliers. The rest of this paper will denote this part of SS as the
allocatable surplus (AS).
Cleared suppliers have incentive to lift their offer prices, until
the clearing price arises to a little bit lower than
while the cleared consumers have incentive to lower their bid
prices, until the clearing price drops to a little bit higher than
. Therefore, we should set the clearing price
for consumers as , and set the clearing price for
suppliers as , so that both sides have no incentive
to manipulate their price (and the equilibrium strategy is to
offer/bid their marginal cost/utility). However, one unique price
is required in the pool-based markets (another problem is, one
needs outside resources to carry the above two-price mecha-
nism). Thus, this paper proposes a unique pricing method using
the insights from the two-price mechanism.
Readers can notice that the discussion is now extended be-
yond the AS area. Let us define another important surplus con-
cept, the pseudo common surplus (PCS), illustrated in Fig. 3 as
the area within the red line. Note that PCS is different from so-
cial surplus. PCS is based on incentive, rather than real surplus.
It is a supplementary tool for deciding a unique pricing, thus
named “pseudo”. The upper and lower borders of the PCS are
PMBs and . For concise notation, further define
(23)
Let be the total cleared demand/
supply (obtained by solving the primal problem of market dis-
patch), we have
(24)
Notice that for the accepted bids, if allocate
surplus for them, they have no incentive to strategically lower
their bids. Define this surplus as CIS (incentive surplus for con-
sumer), which is a part of PCS including AS, we have
. Symmetrically, if allocate sur-
plus for the accepted offers, they have no incentive to strate-
gically lift their offers. Define this surplus as SIS (incentive sur-
plus for supplier), which is a part of PCS including AS, we have
. Notice that there is a unique point at which
PCS is allocated in proportion to CIS and SIS. If the pricing is
based on this rationale, the resultant price should be
(25)
The proposed pricing is derived from an incentive-compat-
ible surplus allocation perspective. The economic foundation
endows the proposed pricing with a group of favorable proper-
ties. Section III-C will compare the proposed solution with other
possible solutions and show that the proposed pricing satisfies
all the five critical properties defining a consistent, impartial,
and stable pricing.
Equation (25) provides an additional relationship between
multipliers and , because on the right side, parameters , , ,
and are determined by the PMBs [as given in (23)] which are
determined by multiplier [as given in (21)], while on the left
side, . Thus, with (25) as the additional equation to the
KKT conditions, we can now solve the equation system and ob-
tain unique values of the Lagrange multipliers in
the MDS situation. Then, the PMBs , , , and param-
eters , , , and can be determined based on a singleton set
of Lagrange multipliers . Therefore, the nodal
market clearing price at the reference bus is uniquely given as
in formula (25). While the nodal market clearing price at any
given bus [say bus ] is uniquely determined as
(26)
A (system-wide) uniform pricing market can be regarded as
a specific case of a locational marginal pricing (LMP)1 market
where the transmission constraints are not considered. In the
uniform pricing situation, the proposed pricing reduces into a
much simpler formulation. Notice that in this situation, the con-
gestion terms in (21) are equal to 0, so the values of pseudo
marginal offers/bids , , , , and parameters , , , and
can be directly obtained (rather than obtained through solving
a set of equations as in an LMP market). Therefore, the uniform
clearing price is directly determined by (25).
1In most pool-based electricity markets, marginal losses are considered in the
LMP calculation. The proposed methodology can be extended to consider the
marginal loss pricing.
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As a summary of the above deduction and analysis, the fol-
lowing procedure can be used as a general program to generate
unique pricing for a certain power system:
1) Solve the market dispatch problem (1)–(5) by standard
LP solver. Get a solution (dispatch). Form KKT condi-
tions and check if the solution can generate a unique set
of multipliers. If yes, use standard approach based on the
set of multipliers for pricing. End. If no, MDS occurs, go
to Step 2) (3) if is not active; go to Step 3) otherwise.
2) Formulate PMBs using (21), formulate parameters , ,
, and using (23), the uniform clearing price is directly
determined by (25). End.
3) Use the dispatch solution to distinguish all the buses into
two categories: the MDS buses (on which all the gener-
ators and consumers are cleared at their upper or lower
limit) and the non-MDS buses (on which at least one
generator or consumer are cleared at neither their upper
nor their lower limit).
4) Choose one MDS bus as the reference bus and form the
KKT conditions of the optimal market dispatch problem
(1)–(5). Locate the optimal solution branch of KKT con-
ditions and form a reduced set of equations with La-
grange multipliers.
5) If the number of equations is equal to the number of
variables (multipliers) , go to Step 8); else if
, go to Step 6); else if (high-order
MDS), go to Step 7).
6) Formulate PMBs using (21), formulate parameters , ,
, and using (23), formulate the proposed pricing cri-
teria using (25). Thus, we get one additional equation of
multipliers. Go to Step 8).
7) Choose of
the MDS buses as the reference bus.2 For each bus
(without loss of generality, the following process uses
the th reference bus), form the KKT conditions of the
optimal market dispatch problem (1)–(5). Locate the op-
timal solution branch of KKT conditions and form a re-
duced set of equations with Lagrange multipliers. Fol-
lowing (21), (23), and (25), an additional relationship
between and can be formed. Use (26) to gen-
erate the nodal price of every bus .
For each bus, the value should be the same
with different reference buses; thus, in total, we have
equations and
variables. Go to Step 8).
8) Obtain a unique set of KKT multipliers and use the
unique set of KKT multipliers to generate unique
clearing price at each bus by (26). End.
C. Properties and Comparison
The previous subsection describes the proposed pricing and
its economic foundation. The economic foundation endows the
proposed pricing with a group of favorable properties other
pricing method does not hold. This subsection first discusses
these properties, and then compares the proposed pricing with
2      because          usually hold in a real system.
other pricing methods based on these criteria. The five proper-
ties discussed in this subsection are:
1) Boundary requirement: the pricing always falls within
the interval defined in (22). Otherwise, the pricing does
not satisfy the social maximization criteria.
2) Consistency requirement: the pricing should be consis-
tent with the normal LMP under non-MDS conditions.
Otherwise, the pricing is incompatible.
3) Neutrality requirement: the pricing should be impartial
between supplier and consumer with respect to the sur-
plus allocation. Otherwise, the pricing will cause biased
allocation of the social surplus.
4) Sensitivity requirement: the pricing should respond
appropriately to changes of offers/bids. Mathematically,
the appropriate response implies the boundedness of
sensitivities of price to offers/bids; otherwise, a small
offer/bid modification will influence the price drasti-
cally, making the market highly volatile and vulnerable
to participants’ behavior/misbehavior.
5) Limit appropriateness: the trend of the pricing should be
appropriate when parameters approach extreme values.
First, let us prove that the proposed pricing satisfies the
“boundary requirement”, i.e., prove that satisfies (22).
Based on (22), (23) can be reformulated as
(27)
First, we consider the left-side inequality. Based on (25):
, , , ,
.
Then from the right-side inequality:
, , , ,
.
This completes the proof that (27) holds.
The inequality (27) can also be understood in the following
way. Notice that in the derivation of above proof, is formulated
as
(28)
Equation (28) can be regarded as dividing AS in proportion to
CIS and SIS. The two formulations of , (25) and (28), indicate
that the proposed method is not only a CIS-SIS allocation of PCS
[as (25) indicates], but also a SIS-CIS allocation of AS [as (28)
indicates], where CIS and SIS are the basic elements. The two
perspectives (allocating AS and allocating PCS) have achieved
agreement under the proposed pricing.
Second, let us examine the “consistency requirement”.
Normal (non-MDS) situations can be regarded as a special
MDS case in which . In this
case, and (25) simplifies to , which is
exactly the standard LMP formula in the non-MDS situation.
In fact, satisfying the “boundary requirement” is a sufficient
condition for satisfying the “consistency requirement”.
Third, let us examine the “neutrality requirement”. When
and , the generation side and demand side
are symmetrical. In this situation, . Then, from (25),
we have , which suggests that is equally
divided between the generation side and demand side.
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Fourth, to examine the sensitivities [12], the partial deriva-
tives of to parameters , , , and are calculated:
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
It can be shown that , , , and
all have upper bounds smaller than or equal to 1 and
lower bounds larger than or equal to 0:
(33)
(34)
(35)
Summarizing (33)–(35), we have
(36)
Equation (36) shows that, for all the possible values of
parameters , , , and , the sensitivities of to parameters ,
, , and are bounded between and a general uniform
ranking of these sensitivities exists.
From (23), we have
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
Based on (36) and from (37)–(40), we have:
, , , and .
In other words, for all possible values of the four PMBs,
i.e., , , , and , the sensitivities of the proposed pricing
to PMBs are bounded within . Note that the sensitivity of
the standard pricing to the marginal bid is one. The marginal in-
fluence of any PMB modification on the proposed pricing will
be at most equal to the influence of a marginal offer/bid mod-
ification on standard pricing. The boundedness of the sensitiv-
ities of price to offers/bids ensures that the volatility/vulnera-
bility of the price to participants’ behavior/misbehavior is lim-
ited. Section IV will provide case studies of the performance of
the proposed pricing to the participants’ offer/bid change.
Lastly, let us examine an extreme scenario in which the last
accepted load is price inelastic. In this situation, , then
; by calculating the limit, we have .
This means that AS is totally assigned to the generation side.
This property characterizes the performance of the proposed so-
lution under extreme/infinite situations. The practical implica-
tion can be understood as follows: from the perspective of the
demand side, can be neglected compared with (when is
infinite/extremely large), while from the generation side, is
still important.
We have now proved that the proposed pricing satisfies the
“boundary requirement”, “consistency requirement”, “neu-
trality requirement”, “sensitivity requirement”, and “limit
appropriateness”. In the following, the proposed method will
be further examined through comparison with other pricing
methods.
Based on the “boundary requirement”, another two price-
setting methods can be derived: 1) dividing AS according to
the proportions between and , which can be formulated as
; and 2) equally dividing AS between
the demand side and the generation side, which can be formu-
lated as .
First, let us examine 1). This method is designed according
to the “boundary requirement” and “limit appropriateness”, so
these two requirements are automatically satisfied. However,
does not satisfy the “neutrality requirement”, because
when , does not exist. In addition, does
not satisfy the “sensitivity requirement” because
and are unbounded.
Next, let us examine 2). This method is designed according
to the “boundary requirement” and “neutrality requirement”, so
these two requirements are automatically satisfied. In addition,
the sensitivities of with regard to parameters , , and are
all constant, and thus bounded. However, is irrelevant to pa-
rameter , so cannot respond to variations in , and therefore
does not satisfy “limit appropriateness”.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section, two cases will be developed to examine the
proposed pricing method. The first case considers a uniform-
pricing scenario, while the second case is a nodal-pricing sce-
nario. The case studies will demonstrate that MDS phenomena
can occur in both markets. Transmission constraints can actually
transform the market optimization from a non-MDS situation to
an MDS situation. The proposed method can address the pricing
difficulty in all these cases.
A. Case 1: Uniform-Pricing Scenario
In this case, a pool-based market with a double-sided auction
is used to examine the proposed method. The generators/loads
information for this case is given in Table I.
In this situation, multiple dual solutions exist and classical
pricing methods cannot determine the market clearing price.
As shown in Section II-B, the pseudo marginal offers/bids
, , , and can be obtained directly through (21) in this
uniform pricing setting. We thus have: , , ,
.
Then by formula (23), we have: , , , .
Then by formula (25), we have:
.
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TABLE I
PARTICIPANTS INFORMATION
Fig. 4. Clearing price versus bid of G2.
Fig. 5. Clearing price versus bid of L2.
Notice that the proposed method has obtained a unique
uniform clearing price and the proposed price satisfies the
“boundary requirement” [ in this case based on
inequality (22)].
In the following part, we will examine the sensitivity of
the proposed pricing method subject to offers/bids variations
of generators/loads. Figs. 4 and 5 show the response of the
proposed price, CPLL, and CPUL to variation of G2’s offer
and L2’s bid, respectively.
In Fig. 4, the response curves can be divided into four sec-
tions (A-D) as G2’s offer changes. In Section IV-A, G2’s offer
is not one of the four pseudo marginal offers/bids, so it has no
influence on . In Section IV-B, G2’s offer exceeds G1’s offer
and becomes , so monotonically increases as G2’s offer in-
creases. In Section IV-C, G2’s offer is still equal to , and G2’s
offer exceeds L1’s bid and becomes CPLL. Therefore, mono-
tonically increases as G2’s offer increases. In Section IV-D,
G2’s offer exceeds G3’s offer, so G2’s offer is no longer one of
the four pseudo marginal offers/bids, so it has no influence on .
Fig. 6. Network topology and locations of participants.
At the same time, because the dual solution is unique and there
is a marginal generator (G3) in this section, standard pricing is
used.
Fig. 5 shows that the response curves can be divided into five
sections as L2’s bid changes. In Sections IV-A, L2’s bid is of
the four pseudo marginal offers/bids, so increases monotoni-
cally as L2’s bid increases. In Sections IV-B, L2’s bid exceeds
L3’s bid and becomes CPLL, so monotonically increases as
L2’s bid increases. In Section IV-C, L2’s bid exceeds L3’s bid
and becomes while L3’s bid becomes . In this section,
still increases monotonically as L2’s bid increases, but the rate
of increase has changed (notice that the curve is convex in
Section IV-B but concave in Section IV-C). Meanwhile, L2’s
bid exceeds G2’s offer and becomes CPUL, so CPUL has the
same behavior as L2’s bid. As L2’s bid rises further, in Section
IV-D, it exceeds G3’s offer, and CPUL is fixed as G3’s offer. In
Section IV-E, L2’s bid exceeds L1’s bid and is no longer one of
the four pseudo marginal offers/bids. Therefore, is not influ-
enced by the variation in L2’s bid.
In this case, a uniform pricing scenario is used to examine the
performance of the proposed method. In summary, the following
observations can be made.
1) When a participant is a marginal participant or one of
the pseudo marginal participants, will increase as
the participant’s offering/bidding price increases (and
the response curve will be sectional if the participant’s
role shifts among the four pseudo marginal participants);
otherwise, will be irrelevant to this participant.
This implies an extension of the classical notion that a
marginal offer/bid decides the market price.
2) When the problem changes from an MDS situation (han-
dled by the proposed pricing) to a non-MDS situation
(handled by standard pricing) or vice versa, the market
clearing price behaves continuously (without a sudden
jump or drop).
B. Case 2: Nodal-Pricing Scenario
In this case, an LMP market with double-sided auction is
used to examine the proposed method. The network topology
is shown in Fig. 6, and generators/loads information is provided
in Table II.
The optimal dispatch can be obtained through linear program-
ming (1)–(5). If the transmission limits are large enough, the
market clearing price at all buses will be the same, set by the
offering price of the last-cleared generator (G31).
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TABLE II
PARTICIPANTS INFORMATION
TABLE III
CLEARED OUTPUT (MW)
When the transmission limits are considered, the resultant
dispatch will be different, as shown in Table III, where G21 is re-
stricted from 1000 MW to 600 MW because of the transmission
limit of line 12. When transmission constraints are active, model
(1)–(5) can still be used to decide the optimal dispatch, but de-
ciding the nodal prices becomes a problem. Because all the dis-
patched generators/loads are cleared at their maximal level, as
we can see in Table III, there is no standard marginal participant.
Following Step 1) of the procedure in Section III-B, the
market dispatch is formulated as follows based on model
(1)–(5) (Bus3 as the reference bus):
(41)
(42)
(43)
(44)
(45)
(46)
(47)
(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)
Since the objective function, equality, and inequality
constraints are all linear, model (41)–(51) can be
solved using standard linear programming. The so-
lution is
.
The optimal solution is in the branch in which , ,
, , , , , , and
. Other nonzero multipliers are bounded with the following
reduced system of equations:
(52)
(53)
(54)
(55)
(56)
(57)
Notice that in the system (52)–(57), there are seven variables
with only six equations; thus, there is
no unique solution.
Following Step 3), based on the optimal solution, all the buses
are categorized into: the MDS buses—Bus1 and Bus3 and the
non-MDS buses—Bus2.
Following Step 4), the Bus3 is chosen as the reference bus
for simplicity; thus, the reduced set of equations with Lagrange
multipliers are directly obtained through (52)–(57). (The other
MDS bus Bus1 can also be chosen as the reference bus; later on,
we will perform that and show that the results will be the same.)
Following Step 5), go to Step 6) because .
Following Step 6), formulate PMBs based on (21). Because
, , , , and , we have
from (52)–(57). Then
(58)
Formulate the intermediate parameters based on (23) with
(58), we have
(59)
Formulate the additional pricing criterion based on (25) with
(59), we have
(60)
Thus, we get one additional equation of multipliers. Go
to Step 8). Now the seven variables
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TABLE IV
NODAL PRICES ($)
in (52)–(57) can be solved because it provides the seventh
equation. The solution of system (52)–(60) is
(61)
Then by (26), the nodal prices can be obtained. The nodal
price results are listed in Table IV, where the results of the un-
congested case are also listed for comparison. The results show
that the proposed method maintains the locational characteris-
tics of LMP. The clearing prices are different between buses.
Because of the congestion of Line12, the price of the load pocket
(Bus1) is higher than the prices of the generation nodes (Bus2
and Bus3).
V. CONCLUSIONS
Both primal and dual programs of a market optimization can
yield multiple solutions, leading to uncertainty in market dis-
patching/pricing. Standard pricing methodology based on La-
grange multipliers cannot guarantee unique solutions in MDS
cases. Existing resolution practices rely on oversimplified or
biased approaches, which are inconsistent with the essence of
smart grid revolution. By extending the spot pricing and surplus
allocation principle, this paper proposes a new pricing method-
ology that guarantees a unique clearing price when there are
multiple dual solutions. The properties of the proposed method
have been analyzed and compared with other pricing practices.
The proposed methodology exhibits a group of desirable charac-
teristics and is consistent with the classical spot pricing theory.
The case studies further demonstrate the robustness and effec-
tiveness of the proposed method in different situations.
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